Cairo reportedly does not wish to complete the delimitation of the EEZ with Greece east of Rhodes without Ankara's participation in the relevant negotiations. This development creates new facts for Greek diplomacy and calls into question previous plans made by Athens. A statement of particular geopolitical significance, which may cause fresh turmoil in Greek-Egyptian relations, was made by New Democracy MP Dimitris Kairidis during a televised discussion on the television station ANT1. According to what the Greek politician stated, Egypt does not appear willing to proceed with completing the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Greece in the area east of Rhodes unless Turkish positions are taken into account beforehand and there is some form of participation by Ankara in the process. Kairidis formulated this specific assessment on November 12 during a discussion with Geopolitics Professor Ioannis Mazis. His statement carries particular weight, as it highlights a potential shift in the Egyptian approach to one of the most important issues of Greek foreign policy.
The 2020 agreement and the critical gap east of Rhodes
To understand the significance of this development, one must return to August 2020, when Greece and Egypt signed a partial delimitation agreement for their maritime zones. That agreement constituted a significant diplomatic success for Athens, as it came in response to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum of November 2019, through which Turkey and the then-government of Libya attempted to draw maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, ignoring the maritime influence of Greek islands, including Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes, and the Kastellorizo complex. The Greek-Egyptian agreement held particular political and strategic value, as it confirmed that the two countries could proceed with delimitation based on the International Law of the Sea, without accepting Ankara's unilateral claims.
However, the agreement was partial. It did not cover the entire maritime area between Greece and Egypt, leaving pending issues east of Rhodes and toward the direction of Kastellorizo and Cyprus. It is precisely in this area that one of the most significant points of contention between Athens and Ankara is located. Greece maintains that islands possess rights to maritime zones in accordance with International Law, whereas Turkey pursues a different approach that significantly restricts the maritime influence of Greek islands.
Turkey's potential involvement causes concern in Athens
If the Egyptian side insists on the necessity of Turkey's participation in the delimitation talks, then Greece will find itself facing a particularly complex diplomatic situation. Until today, Athens treated the delimitation with Egypt as a bilateral process that could be completed based on the principles of International Law and the agreed relations between the two countries. The potential transformation of the process into a trilateral negotiation would fundamentally change the rules of the game. Turkey is not a contracting party to the 2020 Greek-Egyptian agreement and has no right to impose its participation in a bilateral delimitation process. At the same time, Ankara's presence at the negotiating table could offer Turkish diplomacy the opportunity to present its claims as an equal basis for discussion. This is precisely what troubles Athens: not merely Turkey's participation, but the risk of creating a new diplomatic framework within which Greek positions will be placed under negotiation on terms that do not correspond to Greek legal and sovereign perceptions.
What Ankara seeks in the Eastern Mediterranean
Turkey claims that its own approach to delimiting maritime zones would secure roughly 15,000 square kilometers of additional maritime jurisdiction for Egypt compared to the Greek proposal. This is, however, a Turkish calculation and not an internationally agreed delimitation or a recognized maritime border. Ankara is attempting to leverage the argument of economic benefit for Cairo, presenting its own proposal as more advantageous for Egypt. In this way, it seeks to weaken the strategic cooperation between Athens and Cairo and create room for rapprochement with the Egyptian leadership.
Turkish strategy is not, moreover, limited exclusively to the delimitation of maritime zones. It is linked to the broader competition for the energy exploitation of the Eastern Mediterranean, the utilization of potential hydrocarbon deposits, as well as the control of energy and trade routes. Particular significance is also attached to the electrical interconnection between Greece and Cyprus, a project with major geoeconomic and geopolitical implications. The ability to create energy corridors linking the Eastern Mediterranean with Europe constitutes a strategic goal for Athens and Nicosia. Therefore, the dispute over the EEZ does not concern only the drawing of maritime boundaries, but also the future architecture of security, energy, and economic cooperation in the region.
Is Egypt switching sides?
The critical question is whether Cairo is distancing itself from Athens and strategically approaching Ankara. At this stage, such an assessment would be premature. Egypt continues to keep the 2020 agreement with Greece in force, while simultaneously developing its relations with Turkey. For President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, maintaining balances in the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes an important parameter of Egypt's foreign policy. Cairo seeks to keep channels of communication open with all regional powers, avoiding total dependence on a single strategic alliance.
The improvement of Egyptian-Turkish relations in recent years fits into this logic. The two countries have significant economic, commercial, and regional interests, which they seek to serve through the normalization of their relations. This, however, does not automatically mean that Egypt accepts Turkish claims or intends to revise the existing agreement with Greece. Furthermore, so far there has been no official announcement regarding an agreement to establish a trilateral negotiating format between Greece, Egypt, and Turkey. Consequently, Kairidis's statement must be treated as a significant political indication and not as a confirmed decision of the Egyptian government.
The next step for Greek diplomacy
Athens is now called upon to manage a difficult balance. On the one hand, it has no interest in disrupting strategic relations with Egypt, a country with which it cooperates on matters of energy, security, trade, and regional stability. On the other hand, it cannot accept a negotiating framework that could be perceived as indirect recognition of Turkish claims. The Greek government will have to seek clear clarifications from Cairo regarding its intentions, recalling that the existing agreement remains in force and that completing the delimitation constitutes a bilateral issue. The primary objective is not to allow the transformation of a pending bilateral negotiation into a process of political negotiation of Greek maritime rights with Turkey.
Egypt keeps all options open
The statement by Dimitris Kairidis highlights a new and particularly sensitive parameter in the balances of the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt appears to be seeking greater flexibility in its relations with Greece and Turkey, leveraging its geopolitical position to strengthen its room for maneuver. For Athens, the matter is clear: strategic cooperation with Cairo cannot be taken for granted, nor can it substitute for the need for constant diplomatic vigilance. Turkey's participation in potential future discussions does not automatically entail recognition of Turkish positions. However, it could create a new political precedent, which the Greek side will have to handle with particular care. Athens therefore faces a critical diplomatic test: to preserve its strategic relationship with Egypt without allowing Greek positions on maritime zones in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean to be called into question.
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